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Thickening Descriptions with Views 
from Pragmatism and Anthropology
A Commentary on J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day
Saskia K. Nagel
How can we as biological systems that are self-organizing and constantly adapt-
ing make sense of our surroundings? How can the rich connections between or-
ganisms and environment lead to our particular lifeworlds, lifeworlds that allow
individual experiences and that are themselves constantly changing in reaction to
them?  This  commentary  suggests,  extending  the  framework  provided  by  Scott
Jordan and Brian Day, an integration of recent neuroscientific evidence with per-
spectives from pragmatism, anthropology, and phenomenological thought.  Much
experimental evidence demonstrates that human beings are systems comprised of
a brain as part of a body and an environment, which is constantly regulating and
adapting. This evidence resonates with reasoning from pragmatism and anthropo-
logy that describe the continuous, dynamic interaction of mind, body, and world.
Employing those various perspectives leads to a dense description of human ex-
perience and cognition that specifies details and patterns, which considers contex-
tual factors that allow us to enrich human self-understanding, and which aids at-
tempts to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this paper.
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Mind  as  background  is  formed  out  of
modifications  of  the  self  that  have  oc-
curred  in  the  process  of  prior  interac-
tions with environment. Its animus is to-
ward  further  interactions.  Since  it  is
formed out  of commerce with the world
and is set toward that world nothing can
be further from the truth than the idea
which  treats  it  as  something  self-con-
tained and self-enclosed. (Dewey 1934, p.
269)
Knowing does not lie in the establishment
of a correspondence between the world and
its representation, but is rather immanent
in the life and consciousness of the knower
as it unfolds within the field of practice set
up through his or her presence as a being-
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in-the-world  […].  Like  life  itself,  the  un-
folding does not begin here or end there,
but is continually going on. It is equivalent
to the very movement—the processing—of
the  whole  person,  indivisibly  body  and
mind, through the lifeworld. (Ingold 2001,
p. 159)
1 Introduction
Philosophers and scientists alike have long been
interested in the question of how our being-in-
the-world allows us to experience in a plethora
of ways and to behave meaningfully. In extend-
ing the framework suggested by Scott  Jordan
and Brian Day, this commentary suggests integ-
rating recent neuroscientific evidence with per-
spectives  from pragmatism,  anthropology,  and
phenomenological  thought.  The  commentary
shall be programmatic in the sense that it pre-
pares the way for further argument and discus-
sion by making available new perspectives that
invite the reader to look beyond the “classical”
argument and thus benefit from various discip-
lines. The driving questions are: How can we as
biological systems that are self-organizing and
constantly  adapting  make  sense  of  our  sur-
roundings?  How can  we  grasp  our  world  via
perception? How can we skillfully engage with
the  world?  How  can  the  rich  connections
between organisms and environment lead to our
particular lifeworlds; lifeworlds that allow indi-
vidual experiences and that are themselves con-
stantly changing in reaction to them?
One  dominant  approach  to  reality  and
truth has been the correspondence approach of
computational  cognitive  sciences  that  assumes
that  reality can  be  revealed  by science,  inde-
pendently of the personal perspective of an ob-
server. The task of correspondence theories is to
understand the  relation  between observer  and
observer-independent  reality;  a  task  that  as-
sumes  dichotomies  between  inner  and  outer,
between  objective  and  subjective.  Facing  the
limits  of  those  approaches,  Scott Jordan &
Brian Day (this collection) suggest bridging the
riff between the inner and the outer by acknow-
ledging that there is in fact no gap between the
organism and its environment. If one wants to
avoid  the  dualistic  trap  that  asks  how some-
thing inside the “mind”—such as thoughts  or
ideas—can  represent  the  outside  world,  one
challenges the seemingly essential dependence of
cognitive science on representations. 
Much  neuroscientific,  psychological,  an-
thropological, and philosophical work, both old
and new, suggests that we understand cognition
as arising from the actions of embodied agents
that  engage  skillfully  in  a  meaningful  world
(Beauchamp &  Martin 2007;  Brooks 1991;
Clark 1997;  Graziano et  al. 1994;  Lakoff &
Johnson 1999; Noë 2004; O’Regan & Noë 2001;
Thompson 2010;  Varela et al. 1991;  Wilson &
Knoblich 2005).  This  understanding  can  ulti-
mately help us avoid the correspondence theor-
ists’ notorious problem, how the external is con-
nected to the internal. Organisms that are em-
bedded and situated do not need to represent
the  external  environment  as  they  are  always
already about the contexts in which they live.
Moreover, for the situated organism, “the situ-
ation is organized from the start in terms of hu-
man needs and propensities which give the facts
meaning, make the facts what they are, so that
there is never a question of storing and sorting
through an enormous list  of meaningless,  isol-
ated data” (Dreyfus 1992, p. 262). Understand-
ing  organisms  as  always  already  existing  in
meaningful interaction1 with their environment
and thereby constantly adapting and changing
is relevant not just for topics in philosophy of
mind but also for epistemology and metaphys-
ics.  The  metaphysical  question  of  how  mind,
body, and world are related is tightly linked to
epistemological questions about how we can ex-
perience the external world. The central tenet is
how experience can happen at all, i.e., how the
experiencing organism can relate  meaningfully
to the world.
This  commentary  furthers  the  line  of
thought described by Scott Jordan & Brian Day
1 Due to lack of a better concept, the term “interaction” will be
used throughout this article even though it entails clearly separ -
able entities that have previously been independent—an assump-
tion that is contested by the approach suggested here. Moreover,
due to limited space, this commentary cannot take into account
the  aspect  of  intersubjectivity.  The  relevance  of  others  with
whom interaction takes place is inherent in the concept of mind
and its interdependence with the environment (see e.g.,  De Jae-
gher & di Paolo 2007).
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(this collection) by suggesting further perspect-
ives  from  neuroscience,  pragmatism,  and  an-
thropology for approaching cognitive systems as
experiencing,  bodily  systems  that  are  in  con-
stant,  value-laden  interaction  with  the  world;
rather than as systems that primarily mirror an
external reality from a position separated from
the world. Here, I will combine arguments from
John Dewey, in particular his work on experi-
ence, and anthropologist Timothy Ingold, with
recent neuroscientific approaches that support a
view  that  challenges  classical  correspondence
approaches.  This  will  allow  a  thicker  descrip-
tion, i.e., a dense description specifying details
and patterns and considering contextual factors,
of human experience and cognition.
2 Pragmatism and anthropology meet the
neurosciences
In  line  with  much neuroscientific  work today,
Dewey  describes  how  life  is  about  constantly
striving for greater adaptation and for a balance
of energies. He beautifully elaborates:
Life itself consists of phases in which the
organism falls out of step with the march
of  surrounding  things  and  then  recovers
unison with it—either through effort or by
some happy chance. And, in a growing life,
the  recovery  is  never  mere  return  to  a
prior state, for it is enriched by the state
of disparity and resistance through which
it  has  successfully  passed.  If  the  gap
between organism and environment is too
wide,  the  creature  dies.  If  its  activity  is
not enhanced by the temporary alienation,
it merely subsists. Life grows when a tem-
porary falling out is a transition to a more
extensive balance of the energies of the or-
ganism with those of the conditions under
which it lives. (Dewey 1934, p. 535). 
This view resonates with Wild Systems theory,
as suggested by Jordan & Day (this collection),
which explains an organism not as a computa-
tional input–output system but as an open en-
ergy-transforming  system  that  must  absorb,
transform, and use energy to sustain itself. This
does not forestall computation, of course, but it
describes the computational process in a differ-
ent context.
The description of this context can be de-
veloped further to challenge correspondence the-
ories:  correspondence theories  suggest that we
understand cognition when we understand how
humans represent the external world internally,
and when we understand how they process this
representation. The focus on a potentially dis-
embodied input–output machine that passively
receives  information  about  an  observer-inde-
pendent reality and that has an isolated compu-
tational system processing representations can-
not tell us how the internal relates to the ex-
ternal—the  notorious  problem  of  traditional
cognitivism—or how the internal can be enacted
in real-world situations that are often vague and
constantly changing. As Andy Clark explicates: 
Real  embodied  intelligence  […]  is  funda-
mentally  a  means  of  engaging  with  the
world—of using active strategies that leave
much of the information out in the world,
and  cannily  using  iterated,  real-time  se-
quences of body-world interactions to solve
problems in a robust and flexible way. The
image here is of two coupled complex sys-
tems  (the  agent  and  the  environment)
whose joint activity solves the problem. In
such  cases,  it  may  make  little  sense  to
speak  of  one  system’s  representing  the
other. (Clark 1997, p. 98)
Cognition and experience arise from ongoing in-
teraction  with  an  unstable,  changing  environ-
ment. The entanglement of the brain, the rest of
the  body,  and  its  particular  environment—
which includes other organisms—is essential for
experience and reason.  This  is  not the trivial
claim  that  the  brain  cannot  exist  without  a
body; even though the bodily context is often
neglected in research studying brain processes.2
2 The importance of the body was put forward by Maurice Merleau-Ponty
in the  Phenomenology of perception:  “[t]he body”,  he wrote,“ is  the
vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature,
to be involved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain
projects and be” “continually committed to them”‘ (1962, p. 82), and
further: “[o]ur bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of
knowledge; it provides us with a way of access to the world and the ob-
ject, with a ‘praktognosia’, which has to be recognized as original and
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The  message  is  that  reason,  cognition,  mind
arise  from  this  very  entanglement.  How  the
body relates to the environment structures ex-
periences;  there  is  an  immediate  coupling
between perception and action. Cognition is not
a transcendent aspect detached from “matter”
(the brain and the rest of the body in particu-
lar) but is constantly shaped, fostered, and con-
strained by the environment and the body’s pe-
culiarities. 
Anthropologist  Timothy  Ingold  con-
sequently questions whether it makes sense: 
to attribute that quality of the operation
of a cognitive device […] which is somehow
inside the animal and which, from its priv-
ileged site,  processes the data of percep-
tion and pulls the strings of action. Indeed
it makes no more sense to speak of cogni-
tion  as the functioning of  such  a device
than it does to speak of locomotion as the
product  of  an internal  motor mechanism
analogous to the engine of a car. Like loco-
motion, cognition is the accomplishment of
the whole animal,  it is not accomplished
by a mechanism interior to the animal and
for  which  it  serves  as  a  vehicle.  (Ingold
1993, p. 431)
It is thus the interaction of the different systems
that  is  the most  fascinating research topic  in
cognitive science—a topic that requires a hol-
istic  approach.  Such  reasoning  that  considers
circular causalities can be traced back to earlier
thinkers  such  as  Bateson 1973,  Kelso 1995,
Maturana &  Varela 1980,  Thompson 2010,
Varela 1996 or  von Uexküll 1940. This idea of
circular causality as a property of living, self-or-
ganizing systems refers to the connection of per-
ception and movement that underlies the ongo-
ing  co-constitution  of  organism  and  environ-
ment. There is continuous top-down-bottom-up
interaction  that  captures  the  interrelations
between several levels in a hierarchy. The gen-
perhaps as primary. My body has its world, without having to make use
of  ‘symbolic’  or ‘objectifying  function’”  (1962,  p.  140–141;  emphasis
mine). This has been elaborated and enriched in the last years with
views on recent empirical work by Shaun Gallagher (2005), who offers
an account of the body that emphasizes the role of embodied action in
perception and cognition.
eral  underlying  idea  is  that  individual  small-
scale parts enable the existence of order para-
meters that in turn determine the behavior of
the  individual  parts.  Thomas Fuchs (2012)
refers  to  physicist  Hermann Haken’s  2004’s
work on synergetics, the science of self-organiza-
tion,  to  further  illustrate  the  mutually-con-
straining relation between the microscopic and
macroscopic elements of a complex system. Dy-
namic system modeling in various fields relies
on multi-level causal processes in which higher-
order  processes  are  mutually  entrained  with
lower-order processes,  without one taking pre-
cedence over the other (Engel et al. 2001; Free-
man 1995; Lewis 2005; Thelen & Smith 1994).
While a purely cognitivist approach that
fosters “The Myth of the Inner; The Myth of
the  Hidden;  and  The  Myth  of  the  Single”
(Torrance 2009,  p.  112)  is  still  fairly  main-
stream, in recent years we have seen a growing
interest on the part of cognitive scientists and
neuroscientists  in  particular  in  the  relevance
of the complex interplay of brain, body, and
world. Today,  this  interplay  is  finally  con-
sidered  in  the  empirical  study  of  cognition,
which resonates in the growing body of work
in cognitive science.3 The importance  of  em-
bodiment  is  widely  appreciated  in  cognitive
science today. There is a large body of evid-
ence from the neurosciences on how an ongo-
ing organism–environment interaction is essen-
tial for cognition (Beauchamp & Martin 2007;
Brooks 1991;  Chiel & Beer 1997;  Engel et al.
2001, 2013). While we still see attempts to de-
scribe what has been termed the “‘filing cab-
inet’ view of mind: the image of the mind as a
storehouse  of  passive  language-like  symbols
waiting to be retrieved and manipulated by a
kind of neural central processing unit” (Clark
1997, p. 67)—there is growing consensus that
cognition can best be studied and understood
in dynamic, interactionist terms, as bound to
bodily  organisms  that  are  confronted  with
particular problems in specific environments. 
3 Curiously, there is little direct reference to the pragmatists and in
particular to John Dewey’s work. Notable exceptions are Mark John-
son (e.g., 2007) and Jay Schulkin (2009), who offer nuanced and ex-
plicit  pragmatist  views  on  neuroscientific  research.  Philip Kitcher
(2012) offers a wide and detailed demonstration of the importance of
pragmatism for philosophy.
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Dewey once again can serve as an inspiring
reference point: 
To see the organism in nature, the nervous
system in the organism, the brain in the
nervous system, the cortex in the brain is
the answer to the problems which haunt
philosophy. And when thus seen they will
be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a
box but as events are in a history, in a
moving,  growing  never  finished  process.
(Dewey 1991, p. 224)
With this focus on the context and the ongoing
interaction  of  the  organism and its  surround-
ings, one can avoid assumptions of ontological
separations. Going one step further and elabor-
ating on the moral dimensions that Dewey ex-
presses, neo-pragmatist Robert Brandom, in his
account  of  intentionality,  explicates  the  very
idea of pragmatism in a way that links it to the
enactivist approach to cognition: “[a] founding
idea  of  pragmatism  is  that  the  most  funda-
mental  kind of  intentionality  (in  the  sense  of
directedness towards objects) is the practical in-
volvement with objects exhibited by a sentient
creature dealing skillfully with its world” (Bran-
dom 2008,  p.  178).  This  skillful  engagement
with the world is crucial for challenging prevail-
ing paradigms surrounding correspondence the-
ories.
The  respective  holistic  approach  envi-
sioned by Dewey that he powerfully elaborates
with his conception of continuity (Dewey 1934),
and which is  furthered by some neo-pragmat-
ists,  is  reinforced  by  research  in  the  neuros-
ciences that questions the understanding of cog-
nition  as  a  centralized  mirroring  process  that
uses perceptual input to generate the appropri-
ate behavioral output. Brains are studied and
described  as  embodied,  situated,  and  embed-
ded.4 
4 For reasons of space, I cannot discuss the rich debate around the
concepts  of  embodiment,  embeddedness,  and  enactivism let  alone
their relation to the extended mind hypothesis (for parts of the dis-
cussion  see:  Adams &  Aizawa 2008;  Clark 1997,  2001;  Clark &
Chalmers 1998; Rupert 2009; Shapiro 2011; Sprevak 2009; Thompson
2010;  Varela et al. 1991;  Ward &  Stapleton 2012;  Wheeler 2011).
These approaches vastly differ regarding their views on representa-
tions and their general approach to cognition and action. However,
each of them can offer a way of moving beyond the traditional mind-
3 Challenging the “myth of the inner” 
from within the Neurosciences 
In  the  following,  approaches  in  the  empirical
sciences that seek to consider the dynamic, in-
teractionist  nature  of  cognition  will  be  intro-
duced in order to enrich the view of the com-
plexities of adaptive behaviour in self-organizing
systems.
Computational  cognitive  neuroscientist
Olaf Sporns provides a state-of-the-art synthesis
of the sciences of complex networks in the brain
and suggests a view beyond neurocentrism. He
introduces his work as follows:
To understand these systems,  we require
not only knowledge of elementary systems
components  but  also  knowledge  of  the
ways in which these components interact
and the emergent properties of their inter-
actions  […].  We  cannot  fully  understand
brain  function  unless  we  approach  the
brain on multiple scales, by identifying the
networks that bind cells into coherent pop-
ulations,  organize  cell  groups  into  func-
tional brain regions, integrate regions into
systems,  and  link  brain  and  body  in  a
complete organism. (Sporns 2011, pp. 1–3)
While  he  does  not  (yet)  consider  the  further
complexities that come into play when one in-
cludes the environment of the organism, his de-
scription  can  be  seen  as  a  relevant,  though
timid first step away from a purely neurocentric
view. The next step will be to recognize the rel-
evance of environmentally attuned actions, i.e.
to investigate how actions can be understood,
rather than as isolated from the environment, as
being in constant dynamic relation with it, ad-
apting  to  requirements  from the  environment
and in turn shaping it.
There is no doubt that the developmental
perspective is crucial for understanding the dy-
namic  interplay  between  social  and  biological
processes and thus the role of the environment
for  experiences  in  developing  cognition.  From
body dichotomy. Specifically, enactivism focuses on the precise coup-
ling of brain, body, and environment and might therefore be particu-
larly promising for action-oriented approaches.
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early childhood onwards, the brain is shaped by
constant  interaction  with  the  world.  Experi-
ences impact on brain structure and function,
as demonstrated by abundant evidence on the
brain’s  plasticity  (for  classical  studies,  see:
Buonomano &  Merzenich 1998,  Pascual-Leone
et al. 2005). Susan Oyama, in her account of de-
velopmental  systems  theory,  argues  that  the
mind–world dichotomy inherent in descriptions
that  follow  dualistic  accounts  claiming  strong
gaps between the biological realm and sociocul-
tural realm cannot do justice to evolving sys-
tems.  Oyama  invites  us  to  focus  on  change,
rather than constancy. She points to the con-
glomerate of  heterogeneous influences that  al-
lows development. A developmental system is “a
heterogeneous and causally complex mix of in-
teracting entities and influences that produces
the life cycle of an organism” (Oyama 2000, p.
1). This multi-scale, interaction-driven dynam-
ics  requires  an  approach  that  does  justice  to
context-dependency, since it is a particular con-
text that leads to the emergence of a specific
phenotype.  Neglecting the context  would thus
necessarily lead to a failure to understand the
developmental system. 
Complementary to this view, Tim Ingold
describes  how  the  specificities  of  an  environ-
ment and an organism’s history with it matter
for its very existence: 
What goes for the relations between internal
parts of the whole organism also goes for
the relations between the organism and its
environment. Organic forms come into being
and are maintained because of a perpetual
interchange with their environments not in
spite of it […]. But since an ‘environment’
can only be recognized in relation to an or-
ganism whose environment it is—since, in
other words, it is the figure that constitutes
the ground—the process of formation of the
organism is the process of formation of its
environment  […].  Moreover,  the  interface
between them is not one of external contact
between separate and mutually exclusive do-
mains, for enfolded within the organism it-
self is the entire history of its environmental
conditions. (Ingold 1990, p. 216). 
Consequently, rather than speaking of distinct
organisms, Ingold suggests that we would be
better served by speaking of the “whole-organ-
ism-in-its-environment”  (Ingold 2001).  In  a
similar way, Richard Menary suggests cognit-
ive integration as a dynamical account of how
the bodily processes of an organism in its en-
vironment  lead  to  cognition  (Menary 2007),
and  elaborates  how  manipulation  of  the  or-
ganism’s specific environment, development in
that  environment,  and  the  resulting  trans-
formation of  cognitive capacities in this cog-
nitive  niche  matter  for  actual  cognitive  pro-
cesses  and  our  explanatory  models  thereof
(Menary 2010).
In  line  with  such  descriptions,  Andreas
Engel et al. (2013) recently noted what they
saw  as  a  “pragmatic  turn”  in  cognitive  sci-
ence, a turn that leaves aside frameworks fo-
cusing on computation over mental represent-
ation to instead study cognition as being es-
sentially  action-oriented.  Building  on  reason-
ing  from  Clark (1997)  and  Varela et  al.
(1991), Engel and colleagues focus on the rel-
evance  of  action  for  cognition.  They  discuss
evidence  of  perception  as  not  being  neutral
with respect to action but rather  as  part  of
sensorimotor  couplings  that  are  always  spe-
cific for the organism, given its previous learn-
ing, experiences, and expectations. This focus
implies  embodiment and situatedness  just  as
the  context-sensitivity  of  processing.  The
“pragmatic  turn”  is  based  on  much  experi-
mental evidence from studies on sensorimotor
integration and neuronal plasticity that high-
light how cognition is, in a fundamental way,
grounded in action.
Taken together with many more research
lines in the experimental field, these approaches
can further our understanding of the essential
value  of  what  beforehand  was  seen  to  be
“merely”  subjective,  and  not  necessarily  real.
Experience  and  skillful  engagement  with  the
world have a relevant, even an essential role for
cognition. This insight opens the way for a more
encompassing  view  of  human  experience  and
thus  enriches  Jordan and Day’s  account  with
phenomenological,  anthropological,  and  prag-
matist perspectives. 
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4 Why a systems approach matters
While Wild System Theory primarily seems to
offer new possibilities for how to study human
experiences and engagement with the world, it
actually does more: it helps to develop a “the-
ory ‘of what people are’” (Jordan &  Day this
collection, p. 20) by shifting our understanding
of the relationships between brain, mind, body,
and world. These possibilities challenge dicho-
tomies  that  have  for  a  long  time  dominated
classical philosophical views of what human be-
ings are and how they reason and experience.
John Dewey argued against a series  of  dicho-
tomies that were abundant in philosophy, such
as those of mind versus body, fact versus value,
internal versus external, and experience versus
nature  by explicating  the  role  of  continuities,
e.g., between mind and body, and the import-
ance of action for experience. A better under-
standing of  circular  causalities  is  necessary in
order for us to be able to see humans as con-
tinually changing bodily organisms that incor-
porate their histories of past interactions with
their environments, successful adaptations, and
learning processes—each shaped their particular
way of being in the world.5 Such a systems per-
spective does not seek to understand the brain
in isolation, but a person in his or her idiosyn-
cratic context. 
Crucially, the approaches fostered already
by John Dewey, which have today been redis-
covered  by  philosophers  and  neuroscientists
alike, are in fine accordance with phenomenolo-
gical descriptions of  what it  is  like to experi-
ence.  How those  perspectives  converge  into  a
science  of  mind  is  still  to  be  elaborated  and
might receive inspiration from neurophenomeno-
logy, with its call to take seriously introspective
phenomenological  reports  (Lutz &  Thompson
2003;  Varela 1996).  In  particular,  it  can  be
worthwhile to take this view to psychiatry, as a
clinical field deeply dependent on a sensitive un-
derstanding of the relation between mind, brain,
5 The implied essentialisation of biology as a constant of human being, and
of culture as its variable and interactive compliment, is not just clumsily
imprecise. It is the single major stumbling block that up to now has preven-
ted us from moving towards an understanding of our human selves, and of
our place in the living world, that does not endlessly recycle the polarities,
paradoxes and prejudices of western thought (Ingold 2004, p. 217). 
the rest of the body, and the environment. In
psychiatry it becomes particularly evident that
dealing with persons is not the same as dealing
with brains. For example, explaining depression
as a mere chemical imbalance based on a lack of
serotonine (a popular statement that does not
by any means hold universally, even if one fol-
lows a strong reductionist account) does not do
justice to the complex causal relationships lead-
ing  to  the  pathology.  Thomas  Fuchs  compel-
lingly suggests  giving  up the classic  physical–
mental dichotomy that is present in biomedical
reductionism, to develop a proper understand-
ing of the circular causality between an organ-
ism  and  its  environment  (Fuchs 2009,  2011).
Fuchs  explains  how  an  ecological  concept  of
mental illness does justice to findings about how
disorders are a product of the complex interac-
tion of subjective, neuronal, social, and environ-
mental influences. This does not only matter for
our understanding of mental illnesses, but also
importantly impacts on how we approach treat-
ments at various levels. The essential relevance
of recognizing circular causalities in the brain–
body–world  interaction  can  also  be  seen  in
neurological treatment and in the psychological
reactions  of  patients  to  treatments.  Beliefs
about the relationship between brain and mind
and how they relate  to  one’s  personality  and
psychological  well-being  might  influence  reac-
tions to neurological or neurosurgical interven-
tions.  In  particular,  for  treatment  with  deep
brain  stimulation  it  has  been  argued  that  a
framework that is  neither  dualistic  nor brain-
centric, but which offers a perspective that re-
cognizes the manifold interaction between mind,
body, and world can have beneficial effects on
patients and their surrounding (Mecacci & Ha-
selager 2014;  Keyser &  Nagel 2014). Thus, the
quality of therapeutic approaches might benefit
from  examining  more  holistic  approaches  to
psychiatric disorders and therapies. Ultimately,
these theoretical considerations can be crucially
relevant for life in all its facets.
5 Outlook
Abundant  experimental  evidence  demonstrates
that human beings are systems comprised of the
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brain as part of a body and the environment in
a  constant  regulatory,  adaptive  process.  Con-
sequently, we suggest a systems view that con-
siders such complex feedback loops in terms of
circular causality (Crafa & Nagel forthcoming).
As  there  are  manifold  fluctuating  organismic
levels that create feedback loops for continuous
adaptation, studying those feedback loops will
in all likelihood improve our understanding of
how our experience is action-oriented and based
on skillful engagement with the world. Notably,
this  approach  does  not  in  itself  forestall  by
definition the assumption of representations (see
e.g.,  Dennett 2000). I suggest that a computa-
tional view of cognition might not be opposed
to the dynamic, embodied view. It is likely that
we need both approaches in order to understand
how self-organizing dynamic systems constantly
adapting  to  their  environment  are  able  to
reason, solve abstract problems,  use language,
etc  (c.f.,  for  another  synthesizing  suggestion,
Grush 2004).  Computational  explanations  of
how the body and the environment interact can
be  useful  tools  here,  possibly  benefiting  from
ideas such as predictive coding or deep learning
in Artificial Intelligence.6 Such a step includes
blurring the boundaries between cognitive and
sensory-motor processes. So-called low-level and
high-level processes cannot be understood inde-
pendently, since they constantly interact and in-
fluence one another. While symbolic abstraction
is necessary for reasoning, problem solving, or
language, those are strongly coupled to lower-
level processes, such as perception, object ma-
nipulation, or movement. Much conceptual and
empirical work must be undertaken, for which a
mixed  methods  approach  considering  multiple
dimensions  seems  to  be  necessary  and  most
promising. Such an approach —or better, com-
bination  of  approaches—can help  to  integrate
6 Predictive coding is a framework for understanding the reduction
of redundancy and efficient coding in the nervous system. It is
suggested that highly redundant natural signals are processed by
removing the predictable components of the input, thereby trans-
mitting only what is not predictable. Hierarchical predictive cod-
ing  can  explain  response  selectivities  in  networks  (Clark 2001;
Hohwy et al. 2008,  Friston et al. 2010;  Friston & Stephan 2007;
Rao &  Ballard 1999).  Inspired  by  neural  network  processing,
deep learning methods in machine learning aim to produce learn-
ing  of  features  at  multiple  levels  of  abstraction,  thus  allowing
learning of complex functions (e.g., Arel et al. 2010; Bengio 2009;
Hinton et al. 2006).
multiple  levels  of  analysis.  It  might  combine
neurobiological concepts (and these on different
levels as well,  reaching from molecular studies
up to studying systems and interacting systems)
with psychological,  anthropological,  and philo-
sophical studies. For the laboratory, a systems
approach would ask for frameworks that allow
us to study ‘active’ subjects using a variety of
methods.  Mobile  technologies  for  physiological
measurements  are  an  important  step  towards
this goal, as are set-ups that combine different
physiological  measurements.  This  is  an  ambi-
tious  task,  which  demands  technological  and
computational innovation and effort. And, not
least,  studying  mental  capacities  can  be
massively enriched by combining phenomenolo-
gical accounts of experience with cognitive sci-
ence approaches as suggested from the field of
neurophenomenology (Varela 1996).
It is likely that a more holistic view on hu-
man cognition and experience will help us focus
on topics that truly matter to people and that
do  justice  to  their  experience.  One  practical
consequence of a different understanding of the
relationship between mind, body, and world is
its potential effect on human self-understanding,
which in turn can have significant psychological
effects (e.g., Vohs & Schooler 2008). As Gregory
Bateson  frames  it:  “[t]he  living  man  is  thus
bound within a net of epistemological and onto-
logical  premises  which—regardless  of  ultimate
truth or falsity—become partially self-validating
for him” (Bateson 1973, p. 314). Thus, theoret-
ical considerations in the field of philosophy of
mind,  together  with  the  pragmatists’  under-
standing of experience and neuroscientific find-
ings on the relevance of the interdependence of
the brain, the rest of the body, and the environ-
ment shall  lead  to  thicker  descriptions  of  the
multifaceted human condition.
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